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Abstract 
 
The progressive relocation of part of the Energy Intensive Industries (EIIs) out of Europe is one of the 
possible consequences of the combination of emission charges and higher electricity prices entailed 
by the EU-Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). In order to mitigate this effect, EIIs have asked for 
special power contracts whereby they would be supplied from dedicated power capacities at average 
(capacity, fuel, transmission and emission allowance) costs. We model this situation on a prototype 
power system calibrated on four countries of Central Western Europe. In order to capture the main 
feature of EIIs' demand, we separate the consumer market in two segments: EIIs and the rest. EIIs buy 
electricity at average cost price while the rest pays marginal cost. We consider two different types of 
EIIs' contractual arrangements: a single region wide and zonal average cost prices. We also analyze 
the cases where generators only rely on existing capacities or can invest in new ones. We find that 
these average cost contracts can indeed partially mitigate the incentive to relocate activities but with 
quite diverse regional impacts depending on different national power policies. Models are formulated 
as a non-monotone complementarity problems with endogenous energy, transmission and allowance 
prices and are implemented in GAMS. 
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1 Introduction
Climate change is a global issue but the mitigation of its development and extent is still
seen as a regional matter that can be handled by a diversity of means decided at local
level (see the argument of Pizer [15]). The EU, with its Emission Trading Scheme (EU-
ETS or more briefly ETS), has taken the lead in this endeavour, possibly at the risk of
endangering the competitiveness of part of its industry. The ETS is a cap and trade system
that introduces a price for each unit of GHG emitted by the combustion installations covered
by the scheme. This creates costs, both direct and indirect, for the companies operating these
installations. The direct costs (hereafter carbon cost) accrue from the obligation to either
buy allowances or reduce emissions. The indirect cost (hereafter electricity cost) is due to
the higher price of electricity that results from the pass-through of allowance (opportunity)
costs in the price of electricity. Both add up and modify the operations costs of the affected
Energy Intensive Industries (hereafter EIIs). This impact depends on the industrial sector
and may be important for some of the EIIs covered by the ETS.
EIIs have argued that the ETS endangers their competitive positions with respect to
companies of the same sectors located in environmentally less restrictive countries. They
also explain that they will relocate some or all of their activities in these countries in order
to protect their competitiveness. This would reduce emissions in Europe but increase them
outside of the EU. This would result in no environmental benefit but could cost Europe
significant economic and job losses. The expression “carbon-leakage” refers to this relocation
of economic activity and emissions.
The impact of the ETS on industrial activity depends on several factors, among them
(i) the industry’s ability to pass the extra carbon cost onto the final consumer, (ii) the
openness of international trade (iii) the energy intensity of the sector and its capability to
abate carbon, (iv) the allowance allocation method and (v) the product specialization. These
different factors combine to determine whether the sector is largely exposed to international
competition or protected. Service oriented economies will obviously suffer less from the ETS
than those that heavily rely on highly emitting technologies. Delgado [3] elaborates on the
comparatively large part of energy intensive goods in EU export, a phenomenon that is
obviously worrying for a region that intends to take the lead in abatement measures.
Opinions diverge on the importance of carbon leakage. The “Climate Strategy group”
(Hourcade et al. [9]) plays down the danger for Europe. The authors explain that iron and
steel, aluminium, cement and lime are the only sectors that can be affected by the ETS;
they study the UK where these sectors altogether represent only 1% of GNP and conclude
that the problem is minor and particular solutions can probably be found. The proposal for
border adjustment defended by the French government during its presidency of the EU sug-
gests a less optimistic view. The idea of the border adjustment is to counter carbon leakage
by supporting exports by EU industries affected by carbon leakage and taxing those goods
imported from countries with a more lenient environmental system. This proposal clearly ac-
knowledges a problem of competitiveness due to carbon leakage. The European Commission
does not discard this possibility either. Its “Impact Assessment”1 admits “until a compre-
hensive international agreement would be reached, carbon leakage could occur undermining
the overall environmental objective of EU climate and energy policies”. The need to protect
1See Impact Assessment, document accompanying the Package of Implementation measures for the EU’s
objectives on climate change and renewable energy for 2020, Brussels, January 23, 2008. Available at http :
//ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate action.htm.
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the competitive position of the EU industry has accordingly been taken into account in the
design of the proposal of the ETS Directive for the period 2013-2020. Specifically, point 8
of Article 10a of the Directive proposal states that “in 2013 and in each subsequent year up
to 2020, installations in sectors, which are exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage
shall be allocated allowances free of charge up to 100 percent of the quantity determined
in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6”2. This measure will be adopted in case of failure of
international environmental negotiation whose conclusions is foreseen by the year 2011.
Not unexpectedly, representative of the EIIs are most vocal about the impact of the ETS
on their costs. Their position should not necessarily be seen as pure lobbying. These sectors
generally consist of multinational companies that operate worldwide and hence could relocate
part of their production without suffering dramatic economic losses themselves. They would
incur transient costs but no long-term damage; their message can plausibly be interpreted as
advising that European economies and populations, not the firms themselves, would loose a
great deal in the long run.
EIIs have proposed two remedies. One is to introduce sectorial agreements whereby firms
of a given sector would agree to reduce emissions. This has so far not materialized. EIIs also
proposed another measure that today has seen two example of implementation. EIIs have
indeed argued about carbon leakage to demand special electricity contracts to counter the
impact of the ETS on electricity price. The objective of these contracts is to isolate EIIs
from the joint effect of passing the ETS emission allowance (opportunity) costs in electricity
prices in carbon dominated systems, and aligning European electricity prices on these carbon
inclusive prices because of the progressive integration of the electricity market. Specifically
the Finnish pulp and paper industry has succeeded to obtain such a contract with the fifth
nuclear power plant that the Franco-German consortium formed by Areva and Siemens is
building at Olkiluoto on the western coast of Finland3. This principle also underlines in
the formation of the Exeltium consortium in France where a number of electro-intensive
industries4 have managed to conclude long term contracts with EdF5. In both cases, long
term competitiveness and price stability are the arguments invoked to justify these contracts.
This paper is about these contracts: we introduce these special contracts in a prototype
model of the European power sector and provide a first assessment of their impact on in-
vestments in the power sector and their capability to mitigate the impact of the ETS on
EIIs.
An in-depth study of the true impact of special contracts such as those implied in Exeltium
is probably impossible today. A major difficulty is the lack of adequate information on the
reaction of the EIIs to changes of carbon and electricity prices: we know that the ETS affects
these sectors but we are currently unable (from outside the industry) to quantify the impact
of carbon and electricity prices on their activities. But the situation is temporary; pieces
of information are progressively collected and knowledge is progressively accumulating. We
2Source:http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/ets revision proposal.pdf.
3Sources: http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=28308 and
http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=25870.
4These are: Air Liquide, Alacan, Arcelor Mittal, Arkema, Rhodia, Solvay and UPM-Kymmene.
5After negotiations lasted almost three years, EdF and Exeltium have finalized their partnership agreement
following the initiative launched by the government in 2005. With this agreement, industrial consumers who
are Exeltium shareholders are securing part of their electricity supply over the long term. EdF is optimizing
the use of its production facilities by supplying around 13 TWh per year, over a total of 24 years (see
EdF press release at http://www.edf.fr/the-edf-group/press/press-releases/noeud-communiques-et-dossier-de-
presse/edf-group-and-exeltium-finalise-partnership-agreement-600379.html).
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already mentioned the analysis conducted by the Climate Strategy group on the basis of the
UK. It would be interesting to know whether similar industrial structures apply throughout
the EU or will eventually apply as industrial activities move to emerging economies (McK-
insey&Company [10]). Short-term Armington elasticity, such found in (Hourcade et al. [9]),
cannot provide the basis for long- term substitution analysis but process models such as those
presented by Hidalgo et al. [8] and Szabo` et al. [16] can. Also IEA is conducting an in depth
question of this problem. An other difficulty, probably much less pressing, is the insufficient
development of our European power models. The sector is central to the problem of carbon
leakage and the EIIs, but its representation cannot be limited to the sole generation side. The
spatial arrangement and hence the representation of the grid are central for responding to the
EIIs’ question for special contracts. Even though power models that involve a representation
of the grid are not numerous, they are progressively emerging. We use a prototype model
here but mention current activities such as Duthaler et al. [6], Perekhodtsev [14] and Zhou
and Bialek [17].
This paper takes stock of this emerging activity and provides a prototype study of the
impact of special contracts such as those implied by Exeltium, possibly combined with free
allowances as foreseen by the Commission’s proposals. The paper is organised as follows:
Section 2 describes the principle of the special contracts demanded by EIIs. Section 3 presents
our methodology and Section 4 is devoted to the models and input data. Sections 5, 6 and
7 explain the main results and Section 8 concludes. The model used is described in Oggioni
and Smeers [12],[13].
2 Cost Based Electricity Contracts
Investments in both EIIs and the power sectors are capital intensive and long term. As
discussed in the introduction, schemes such as the ETS affect these investments in at least
two ways. By imposing the covered EIIs an obligation either to abate or surrender an emission
allowance per ton of emitted CO2 equivalent, the ETS directly increases the production cost
of the firms in these industries. By imposing a similar obligation to the power sector, the ETS
also entails an increase of the price of electricity and hence further raises the production cost
of the EIIs. These two phenomena come on top of a general evolution that sees a progressive
movement of large energy consuming industries away from developed to emerging economies
(McKinsey&Company [10]). New investments of EIIs in Europe, which may already be
questioned in the current economic conditions are then becoming more at risk as a result of
this double cost effect. Recall that this risk is incurred without any environmental benefit in a
carbon leakage context: emissions are not reduced but simply displaced from Europe to other
places of the world. Emissions will even probably increase to the extent that the displaced
installations connect to less carbon efficient power systems. This relocation of industrial
consumption introduces a demand risk that adds to the already uncertain environment that
surrounds investments in the power sector.
Contracts that guarantee the delivery of electricity on the long run (e.g. 15 years) at
a controllable overall cost, possibly backed by dedicated capacities, can mitigate that risk
and reduce the cost, benefiting both EIIs and the power sector. The principle of these
contracts is straightforward even if their implementation may be complex: an energy intensive
consumer procures electricity forward over a long period by essentially paying its full cost
(investment and operations) independently of the vagaries of the prices on power exchanges.
4
This contact is normally for high load electricity, corresponding to a base activity of the
electricity consuming EII firms. It is thus associated to a base load unit, which, because
of its high capital cost is more risky to invest in without a long term guarantee of delivery
even if it is cheaper to operate. The electricity price contains a fixed part corresponding to
the investment cost. It may contain a variable fuel part, which is in any case a world price
(coal or nuclear fuel). If fossil fuel based, the electricity price would also contain a CO2
contribution. The principle of the cost based contract is that this CO2 contribution would
be paid at average cost and not according to a marginal cost principle that EIIs object to.
EIIs argue that marginal cost pricing increases electricity prices and they advocate a return
to average cost pricing. As in the Finnish and the Exeltium consortium cases, EIIs ask for
these cost based electricity contracts, possibly backed by dedicated facilities.
3 Methodology
3.1 Model Description
The problem of the possible impact of the ETS on EII sectors is long term. We accordingly
cast average cost power contracts in a model that can accommodate, at least partially in this
paper, investments in new capacities. In order to do so, we construct a power model (see
Oggioni and Smeers [12], [13]) where demand is decomposed into two segments; one segment
consists of the firms of the covered EII sectors (EIIs hereafter), the other segment gathers the
rest of the demand (N-EIIs hereafter). The power sector is represented by a process model
where the different generation plants are explicitly described on a technological basis 6. These
models are well mastered both in the literature and in practice and the representation adopted
in this paper is standard. The demand sectors are described differently. We classically model
the N-EIIs’ sector by a demand function. We would also ideally adopt a process model
for describing the EIIs, but even though these exist for the cement and steel sectors (see
Demailly and Quirion [4], Hidalgo et al. [8] and Szabo` et al. [16]), they are far from standard
today. One can also note that while GHG studies extensively rely on power sector models,
they generally adopt a much simpler description of the consuming sectors. We follow suit
and simplify the description of the EIIs into a linear demand function that that we calibrate
on the basis of Newbery [11]. This modelling of the EII sectors implies that we interpret a
reduction of their demand as a relocation of activities that measures the carbon leakage effect.
This is admittedly a rough representation of the reaction of these industries as it does not
differentiate between activity relocation and energy efficiency improvements. Still it suffices
to qualitatively capture the impact of the ETS on EIIs. We shall show that it also allows
one to represent both the carbon and the electricity costs and hence permits differentiating
between different policies of free permits allocations to the energy consuming sectors.
Throughout the paper we make the blanket assumption that all agents are price takers
or alternatively that large energy consumers can impose average cost pricing on generators
(or that they can build their own units and hence procure electricity at average cost). We
justify the assumption as follows. While it is apparently easy to find evidence of the exercise
of market power by generators, the literature shows that it is equally easy to criticize this
evidence. Moreover there is no well admitted paradigm for modeling the exercise of market
power by generators (Cournot is technically simple and supply functions difficult; but none of
them is substantiated by convincing empirical evidence). Introducing market power is thus
6Different type of generation units with their technological characteristics.
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a somewhat arbitrary exercise outside studies that explicitly aim at measuring its exercise.
Note that this blanket assumption does no imply that all models presented here are of the
perfect competition type as average cost pricing deviates from the long run marginal cost
pricing which would be the rule in perfect competition. Last we mention that our models
always account for the emissions of the power sector, and in some version (see infra) also
for the emissions of the EIIs. Emissions are capped, which implies that the price of CO2 is
endogenous.
Transmission is represented according to a flowgate model which is the approach currently
discussed for CWE by transmission system operators. This network model is well known in
the literature7. The representation includes a node, the so–called hub node, where electricity
asks and bids converge and clear. The hub can be considered as a virtual market that sets
the electricity price. In this system, generators send the electricity they produce to the hub
where energy is withdrawn and delivered to consumers located in the different nodes. Power
trade must respect the capacity limit of the lines composing the grid. A Power Transfer Dis-
tribution Factor PTDF matrix determines both the directions and the proportions of power
flowing through network lines as a function of nodal injections and withdrawals. Constraints
impose that the sum over all nodes of the proportion of the net power flow injected into
and withdrawn from all nodes and passing through a network line to reach the hub must
be lower than the capacity of the line used to transfer electricity. This limits the set of
possible injections and withdrawals. Congestion arises when at least one of the grid lines is
overloaded. National Transmission System Operators (TSO hereafter) are in charge of reliev-
ing the network congestion and their operating costs are paid by final electricity consumers.
Congestion costs are added to the electricity price set at the hub and differ with generators
and consumers’ locations in the network. We work with a zonal representation of the grid
that therefore implies a zonal pricing system.
3.2 Analysis Structure
We consider three views of the problem of increasing technical complexity and discuss results
in Sections 5, 6 and 7 respectively. The first two views (hereafter referred to as “IFC”
(Indirect ETS costs with Fixed Capacity) and “II” (Indirect ETS costs with Investments)
respectively) concentrate on the pass-through of allowance prices in electricity prices (the
electricity cost). The first version of the problems (IFC) assumes fixed generating capacities,
the second one (II) allows for possible investments. The latter cases (II) are obviously more
realistic, but we also retain the simpler fixed capacity (IFC) cases because they allow for a
first, simpler, presentation of the phenomena. Both views of the problem are constructed by
assuming an emission cap for the sole power sector, without any trade of allowances with
the EIIs. The third view of the problem, hereafter referred to as “DII” (Direct and Indirect
ETS costs), additionally deals with the carbon effect, that is the net effect for EIIs of trading
allowances on the market, taking into account their emissions and the allowances that they
receive free. We cast both the carbon and electricity costs in the electricity demand function
of EIIs. The industrial electricity consumption is then affected by two factors: the electricity
price, which embeds the “electricity cost” and a carbon component which is the “carbon cost”
and reflects the EIIs’ position on the emission market. In this latter view of the problem
(DII) we also modify the emission constraint in order to account for the emissions deriving
from the industrial production activities.
7See the section on flowgate on the HEPG website.
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These different view of the carbon leakage problem, considering first the increase of elec-
tricity prices (IFC and II models) and then the combination of both this increase and the
trading of allowances by EIIs (DII) is also quite in line with practice as representatives of
the EIIs mainly complained about high electricity prices during the first compliance period
of the ETS.
Each of these three views of the carbon leakage problem in turn gives rise to four models
that we respectively note by NETS R, ETS R, ETS SAC and ETS ZAC. The first model
(NETS R) adopts the perfect competition paradigm in the sense that the two demand seg-
ments pay an identical electricity price that is equal to the marginal production cost of the
unit that is highest in the merit order. It also supposes that there is no ETS. The second
model (ETS R) works under the same perfect competition scenario, but assumes that the ETS
is in force. We introduce these cases both for reference and calibration purposes. The perfect
competition paradigm under the ETS indeed includes a full pass-through of the marginal
(opportunity) cost of allowances in the price of electricity, independently of the procurement
of these allowances by power companies. This is the situation that EIIs complain about
when they refer to the windfall profits of the power companies that pass in the electricity
price the allowances that they partially received free. In order to introduce the cost based
electricity contracts, we modify this reference model by splitting the capacity in two parts
endogenously dedicated to each market segment. Generators then adapt their generation mix
to the pricing scheme in each market segment. N-EIIs face the marginal cost price of their
dedicated capacities that adapt to their time varying demand. EIIs benefit from the average
cost contracts suited to their high load demand. We then consider two different average cost
contracts respectively identified by ETS SAC and ETS ZAC that reflect prevailing and pos-
sibly forthcoming conditions in the European electricity market. The first pricing scheme is
regional and referred to as ETS SAC. It assumes that the transmission system has developed
to a stage that EIIs can and do procure electricity on a regional basis. The region in this
case is Central West Europe, hereafter CWE (see ECN [7]); it consists of Belgium, France,
Germany and the Netherlands. All EII firms in the the region pay the same average cost that
includes the full generation cost (capacity, fixed and variable operating, fuel and CO2 costs)
of the dedicated capacities and the transmission cost (congestion charges) from generation to
EII consumers. The latter is computed according to a flowgate model mentioned above. The
case law of European competition authorities considers that this regional market is not es-
tablished yet. The second pricing scheme takes stock of this jurisprudence and supposes that
EII firms procure electricity at average cost on a local, here zonal basis, hereafter referred to
as ETS ZAC. This average cost then boils down to the full average generation cost (capacity,
fixed and variable operating, fuel and CO2 costs) of the dedicated capacities of the zone,
without any transmission component. Both ETS SAC and ETS ZAC models are inspired by
the approach followed by French EIIs when constituting the Exeltium consortium in order
to buy electricity from generators at a French market-wide full cost based price. The two
average cost pricing schemes, ETS SAC and ETS ZAC, considered here only differ by the
regional scope of the consortium and the implication of the transmission component on the
average cost price. Finally, we consider the so–called “EIINA” and “EIIA” scenarios which
respectively indicate the cases where EIIs do not receive and receive free allowance when they
participate to the emission market.
N-EIIs and EIIs’ fuel costs, capacity costs and reference demands are identical throughout
the three views. This allows us to examine the evolution of results under different organiza-
tional scenarios without data playing an impact on the results. This step by step methodology
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also allows us to analyze the EIIs’ problem under progressively more complex aspects. Note
that the structure of the average cost price models is such that generators are constrained to
conclude average cost based contracts with EII companies which in turn can exercise monop-
sony power since have access to dedicated power. An interesting question is whether power
companies effectively gain from the application of these long term contracts. This is reported
in the welfare analysis. We summarizes the overall structure of the analysis and the different
models and their nomenclature in Table 1.
Models
Analysis Steps Leakage Mitigation Scenarios
IFC NETS R ETS R ETS SAC ETS ZAC
II NETS R ETS R ETS SAC ETS ZAC
DII EIINA NETS R EIINA ETS R EIINA ETS SAC EIINA ETS ZAC
EIIA NETS R EIIA ETS R EIIA ETS SAC EIIA ETS ZAC
Table 1: Analysis Steps and Scenarios
4 Model Setting
The analysis is applied to a stylized representation of the Central Western European (CWE)
power market depicted in Figure 1. Data of this model are available on the Energy Research
Center of the Netherlands (ECN [7]) website. We also calibrate the rest of the model for the
year 2005 which saw the inception of the ETS and is also the first year for which emissions
are recognized to be independently and consistently verified.
The power market depicted in Figure 1 comprises fifteen nodes distributed over four
countries: Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Electricity production and con-
sumption activities are aggregated in seven nodes: two in Belgium (Merchtem and Gramme),
three in the Netherlands (Krimpen, Maastricht and Zwolle), one in Germany (“D”) and,
finally, one in France (“F”). The remaining German and French nodes are passive and are
only used to transfer electricity. Nodes are connected by 28 flowgates with limited capacity.
There are 10 cross-border flowgates: two connect Germany and the Netherlands and three
link the Netherlands and Belgium; there are three lines between Belgium and France and
two between France to Germany. The model of the grid follows the standard DC load flow
approximation: flowgates are characterized by limited transfer capacities, which constrain
power flows, and by Power Transmission Distribution Factors (PTDF ) that distribute injec-
tion and withdrawals of electricity along the lines. These data (see ECN [7]) are reported in
Figure 1. The big German node is the hub node where all power asks and bids converge and
define the system electricity price.
As foreseen by the FlowBased Market Coupling project of the CWE’s electricity systems,
the clearing of this market results from an interaction between the PXs and the TSOs of
the region that can be assimilated to the solution of a consumer and producer surplus max-
imization in CWE subject to transmission constraints. The system currently operates on
three countries only (the above minus Germany) and still uses a representation of the grid
by transmission capacities. It should include Germany and move to the flow based represen-
tation of the grid soon. We anticipate this evolution and directly adopt the flow based, or
flowgate representation of the grid. This system introduces a market of transmission rights
that agents pay for to the Transmission System Operators.
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Figure 1: Central Western European market and network line capacities
We assume eight European power companies8 plus a fringe which assembles the remaining
small generators. These companies supply this market by running eight different technologies:
hydro, renewable, nuclear, lignite, coal, CCGT, old gas and oil based plants. These units are
ranked in merit order that is endogenously determined as a function of the (exogenous) fuel
prices and the (endogenous) transmission constraints. This assumption implies a staircase
representation of the supply curves whose shape is directly influenced by the marginal costs
of the different technologies. Plant capacities’ values are taken from the public 2005 reports
of the power companies included in the models.
Depending on the view of the problem (see Section 3), electricity is produced either by
existing or new power plants. In order to simplify both the database and the interpretation
of the results, we assume that old and new capacities have identical variable and fixed costs.
The models obviously allows one to change this assumption and apply different efficiency
rates to new plants. Doing so in this prototype study would however cloud the results that
would then be influenced by both fundamental economic phenomena and sometimes arbitrary
data differentiations.
Generators supply both EIIs and N-EIIs. For reasons explained in Section 3, it is currently
quite difficult to resort to sectorial models of the EIIs sectors, whether process or econometric
models. We use linear demand functions to describe these two consumer groups. We construct
them by setting a reference power price of 40 e/MWh and reference elasticity values of -0.1
and -1 respectively for N-EIIs and EIIs. As already said, the -1 value is taken from Newbery
[11]. This elasticity’s assumption may appear too high, but our goal is to get insight into
the way cost based contracts mitigate the EIIs’ difficulties. We are not in a position in this
paper to come up with a precise quantification of these effects9.
The period analyzed is one year composed of 8760 hours subdivided into two sub-periods:
the so–called summer (5136 hours) and winter (3624 hours). We are thus effectively working
with the base-load demand of each consumer group in winter and in summer. We differentiate
this based load demand by node. We suppose, as is the case in CWE, that N-EIIs have a
8EdF, Electrabel, E.ON Energie AG, ENBW Energieversorgung Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, Essent Energie Pro-
ductie BV, Nuon, RWE Energie AG and Vattenfall Europe.
9Nevertheless, we also tested the case where the industrial demand elasticity equals -0.8 to verify the
robustness of our results.
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higher power demand in winter than in summer. EIIs’ power demand is constant over the
year.
After transmission rights and electricity, emission allowances constitute the third com-
modity exchanged on this market. The carbon market is simply modelled by an emission
constraint where the total cap is computed on the basis of the data available from the Commu-
nity Independent Transaction Log ([1]). We used the report by Davis and URS Corporation
[2] as a reference for the emission factors of the different generation technologies. We ex-
plain the computation of EIIs’ emission factors in Appendix G. We assume full auctioning of
allowances to generators and a benchmarking method for allocating free allowances to EIIs.
We follow the structure of analysis introduced in Section 3 and accordingly first present
the results of the models with fixed generation capacity. We later allow generators to invest
in new power plants and finally consider the scenarios where EIIs are inserted in the ETS. In
order to simplify the notation we do not refer to the section identifier (IFC, II, DII. See Table
1) when discussing results obtained under the assumptions of the section. Various appendices
provide additional information. Oggioni and Smeers [12], [13] give the technical details of the
model.
5 Indirect Electricity Cost with Fixed Capacity Scenarios (IFC)
Table 2 reports the global impact of the different policy scenarios on electricity demand, that
we analyze in more details in this section.
TWh N-EIIs EIIs Total
IFC NETS R 649 598 1,248
IFC ETS R 646 531 1,177
IFC ETS SAC 634 555 1,189
IFC ETS NAC 623 565 1,188
Table 2: EIIs’ hourly demand without and with the EU-ETS
As announced, we drop the section’ s identifier (here “IFC”) when referring to scenarios
conducted with fixed capacity.
5.1 Reference Case with (IFC ETS R) and without (IFC NETS R) ETS
The inception of the ETS emission trading globally decrease EIIs’ electricity consumption
from 598 TWh (NETS R) to 531 TWh (ETS R). N-EIIs’ reduction is from 649 TWh to 646
TWh. The pricing effects leading to that reduction of demand are analyzed in Appendix B.1.
The fall of EIIs’ demand is significant but driven by our assumption of a long-term EIIs’ price
elasticity of -1 at the reference demand point of 40 e/MWh. It illustrates the EIIs’ threat of a
long-term relocation of some of their facilities outside of Europe and the carbon leakage that
it implies. It also highlights the importance for Europeans of properly and rapidly assessing
the effective reaction of the EIIs to the changing electricity price implied by the ETS.
The decreased electricity demand and the utilization of less polluting technologies also
imply an emission reduction. There is a cut of CO2 emissions from 464 Mio Ton before the
inception of the ETS (NETS R) to 397 Mio Ton (ETS R) which is the cap imposed on the
power sector in this stage of analysis. The allowance price amounts to 24.44 e/ton.
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5.2 Regional (IFC ETS SAC) and Zonal (IFC ETS ZAC) price
Average cost pricing policies partially relieve EIIs’ burden while maintaining the global emis-
sion target. On the positive side, both the regional (ETS SAC) and the zonal (ETS ZAC)
prices increase EIIs’ electricity consumptions compared to the reference marginal cost prices
(ETS R). The negative side is that not all EIIs benefit from the application of these pricing
schemes and the final results depend on national energy policies. The increase of demand
does not go as far as recovering the activity levels observed before the inception of the ETS.
The regional price (ETS SAC) increases EIIs’ consumption from 531 TWh to 555 TWh.
EIIs enjoy lower electricity prices in Germany, the Netherlands and in the Belgian location
Merchtem, which increase their activities. In contrast the single price policy increases EIIs
power costs in France and the other Belgian node Gramme with a consequent decrease of their
electricity consumption. The price increase is particularly high in France (+69%) where EIIs’
electricity consumption falls from 218 TWh to 170 TWh. In Gramme, the decrease is just of
1% (from 17,2 TWh to 17 TWh). These EIIs’ demand decreases are globally compensated
by increases in other nodes, leading to the final aforementioned 5% augment of the EIIs’
demand (Table 2).
The zonal price (ETS ZAC) also has a global positive effect on EIIs. It increases their elec-
tricity consumption from 531 TWh to 565 TWh compared to marginal cost pricing (ETS R)
and with an increase from 555 TWh to 565 TWh does slightly better than the single price
(ETS SAC). But here again, this global positive effect results from quite different local im-
pacts on EIIs. Nuclear capacity in France and in the Belgian node Gramme, combined with
zonal pricing system drastically mitigates the EIIs’ electricity costs in these locations. EIIs
are supplied by local power plants in this regime and do not have to share cheap and clean
electricity with foreign EIIs’ plants as in the single price (ETS SAC) scenario.
The situation of EIIs is more critical in countries where electricity is mostly produced by
fossil technologies as in the Netherlands and the Belgian node Merchtem. Industries effec-
tively suffer from the zonal price policy. In Germany, the industrial electricity consumption
decreases from 270 TWh to 236 TWh with respect to the single price (ETS SAC), but re-
mains 7% higher than in the marginal cost pricing case (ETS R) where the consumption level
is 220 TWh.
This global improvement of the EIIs’ situation resulting from an economically inefficient
policy (average cost pricing) is to be paid somewhere. One indeed observes that the single
and the zonal prices respectively decrease N-EIIs’ electricity consumption from 646 TWh to
634 TWn (ETS SAC) and from 646 TWh to 623 TWh (ETS ZAC) compared to marignal
cost pricing policy (ETS R).
5.3 Welfare Analysis
The welfare analysis of Table 3 gives an alternative view of these results. The lines “EIIs”,
“N-EIIs” and “Consumers” are self-explanatory. The lines “Generators” and “Allowances”
respectively report the generators’ profits and the allowance values obtained by multiplying
the market cap of 397 Mio ton p.a. by the allowance prices of the different scenarios (an
allowance comes at 28.48 e/ton and at 28.21 e/ton in the regional (ETS SAC) and zonal
(ETS ZAC) pricing systems. The generators’ profits are computed assuming fully grandfa-
thered allowances and hence are higher than before the inception of the ETS (NETS R).
Generators’ profits decrease when allowances are totally or partially auctioned. In case of
full auctioning the generators’ profits are obtained by subtracting the allowance value from
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the profit reported at the “Generators” line. Note that this profit representation allows us to
evaluate the impacts of different proportions of free allocation on generators’ profits. Finally,
Table 3 lists the TSO’ merchandising profits in the different cases. These profits accrue from
the application of the flowgate model to manage the congestion of the transmission system.
Except for the single price scenario, (ETS SAC), EIIs’ surpluses evolve in parallel with
electricity consumption. The decrease of EIIs’ surplus in the regional price policy, notwith-
standing the global consumption increase, results from the significant drop (-47%) of the
French EIIs’ surplus which is not compensated by increases in other nodes. Recall that
French EIIs reduce their power demand by 22% in this regional price regime.
Billion e IFC NETS R IFC ETS R IFC ETS SAC IFC ETS ZAC
EIIs 15.53 12.08 11.64 13.49
N-EIIs 130.87 129.35 124.65 120.20
Consumers 146.40 141.43 136.29 133.69
Generators 25.22 29.25 32.94 36.78
Allowances 9.70 11.32 11.21
TSO 0.65 0.90 1.26 0.10
Welfare 172.27 171.58 170.49 170.58
Table 3: Welfare under Different Fixed Capacity Scenarios
6 ETS Induced Electricity Costs: Introducing Investments
(II)
We adapt the preceding analysis to the case where generators can invest in all locations,
subject however to national prohibitions and technological possibilities. Specifically, genera-
tors can build new nuclear power plants only in France, lignite is restricted to Germany and
hydro power stations are not available in Belgium and in the Netherlands. Since investment
is a long term phenomenon, we replace the 2005-2007 emission cap of the power market used
with fixed capacities by the more restrictive CO2 level allowed in the 2008-2012 ETS phase.
In particular, we fix it to 359 Mio Ton p.a10. The rest of the model and the structure of the
analysis remain unchanged. We first define reference investment scenarios with and without
the emission constraint (II ETS R and II NETS R) and then apply the regional and zonal
price (II ETS SAC and II NETS ZAC). As before we drop the section’s identifier (here “II”)
when referring to scenarios conducted with investments.
The global impact of the different policies on electricity demand is given in Table 4.
One notes at the outset that investments increase electricity consumption with respect
to the model with fixed capacity (compare Table 2). This holds in all scenarios studied as
detailed in Appendix C. Investment is thus the first remedy to the ETS induced electricity
cost. Notwithstanding these consumption increases, the allowance prices are lower than in
the corresponding fixed capacity cases as a result of the higher proportion of (new) CO2 free
10We computed this value on the basis of information provided by the European Commission for the pe-
riod 2008-2012. See http : //europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference = IP/07/1869&format =
HTML.
12
TWh N-EIIs EIIs Total
II NETS IR 665 706 1,371
II ETS IR 654 590 1,244
II ETS SAC 650 575 1,225
II ETS ZAC 654 611 1,265
Table 4: Annual Electricity Demand under Different Investment Scenarios
capacity. Allowance prices are 19.21 e/ ton, 24.80 e/ton and 19.26 e/ton respectively in the
marginal cost price, regional price and zonal price (II ETS R, II ETS SAC and II ETS ZAC)
models against 24.44 e/ton, 28.48 e/ton and 28.21 e/ton in the corresponding scenarios
when when capacity was fixed (IFC ETS R, IFC ETS SAC and IFC ETS ZAC respectively).
We elaborate on these results.
6.1 Reference Case with (II ETS R) and without (II NETS R) ETS
Notwithstanding investments in clean technologies, the ETS still imposes significant electric-
ity costs on EIIs as we now explain. Generators build a total of 43,788 MW of new capacities
without CO2 constraint (NETS R) and only 29,242 MW with the ETS (ETS R). Table 4
shows the consumption counterpart of this investment decrease: EIIs lessen their power con-
sumption from 706 TWh (NETS R) to 590 TWh (ETS R). This cut is proportionally higher
than under the fixed capacity approach where it was of 11%. Similarly N-EIIs consumption
drops 665 TWh to 654 TWh (again proportionally more than the 0.5% with fixed capacity).
The price effects leading to these drop are described in Appendix B.2.
The ETS also induces generators to change their technology mix towards clean technolo-
gies. The switch concerns the utilization of existing capacities but mainly applies to the choice
of new ones. Generators reduce the utilization of existing lignite/coal power plants in favour
of CCGT and clean technologies in the ETS scenario. They also replace the investments in
lignite and coal with new renewable based plants. Investments in nuclear remain high, but
as mentioned above are limited to France. The detail of these investments in presented in
Appendix D.
6.2 Regional (II ETS SAC) and Zonal (II ETS ZAC) Price
Roughly speaking, generators maintain the ETS driven investment pattern under average
cost prices. The question is whether these contracts change electricity costs in a way that
mitigates the impact of the ETS on demand and investments. The electricity consumption
reported in Table 4 helps understanding the following investment figures. Total investment
amounts to 26,195 MW with regional price (ETS SAC), a reduction compared to the 29,242
MW investment under marginal cost pricing (ETS R). The regional price therefore appears
counter-productive. In contrast, investment amounts to 31,992 MW with the zonal price
(ETS ZAC) and hence does better than under marginal cost prices. Zonal pricing is thus still
an effective remedy to the ETS induced electricity cost. We now delve into these differences.
6.2.1 Capacity allocation does not explain these different impacts
The allocation of new capacities to EIIs and N-EIIs differs in the zonal and single average cost
pricing policies but this is compensated by the allocation of existing capacities (see Appendix
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E for some elaborations). The total renewable and nuclear capacities allocated to EIIs are
almost identical, whether in the regional or zonal price regimes11. The proportion of the
other technologies dedicated to EIIs is also similar in both average cost price regimes 12. The
totals are different though: the capacity dedicated to EIIs amounts to 65,642 MW and 69,758
MW respectively in the regional (ETS SAC) and zonal (ETS ZAC) price regimes. This is
compatible with the consumers’ demand reported in Table 4.
6.2.2 National energy policies explain the different impacts
As already observed in the fixed capacity analysis, the regional price entails a drop of con-
sumption compared to marginal cost pricing in those zones where nuclear capacity is signif-
icant. Investments reinforce these effects. Specifically French EIIs’ consumption decreases
from 243 TWh with marginal cost pricing to 176 TWh with the regional price. The reason is
that the regional price reduces the cost of imports of French nuclear electricity by countries
that cannot invest in that technology. In other words, the regional price forces French EIIs
to share national nuclear capacity with foreign industries.
The impact is dramatic: total French nuclear generation for EIIs is 30,492 MW with
regional price of which 20,091 MW (66% of total production) supplies domestic EIIs and the
remaining 10,400 MW is exported. French electricity prices for EIIs become higher than the
average of the marginal cost prices of the reference ETS scenario with investments (II ETS R),
leading to a 28% cut of EIIs electricity consumption. A similar phenomenon appears at the
Belgian node Gramme where industries reduce their power demand by almost 10% under a
single price policy applying with ETS (from 19 TWh in the ETS R model to 18 TWh in the
ETS SAC case). Contrarily, the regional price is lower than the former marginal cost in the
other nodes, because they benefit from these exports at average generation and transmission
cost. To sum up, EIIs’ electricity cost decreases and energy demand increase, at all nodes
but France and Gramme. Together these positive effects are not sufficient to compensate the
high negative demand variations registered in France and in Gramme. The results is a global
cut of industrial electricity demand of about 2.6% with respect to the reference ETS levels
(ETS R)13.
N-EIIs do not do well either in the regional price scenario (ETS SAC). They globally
reduce their power consumption by 1% with respect to the ETS reference case (ETS R) as
seen in Table 4. As explained in Appendix F, this is due to the price of allowances.
The situation is altogether different with zonal price where local generators supply EIIs.
They increase their global electricity consumption by 4% and 6% with respect to the reference
ETS (ETS R) and single (ETS SAC) price scenarios (see Table 4). The drawback is that this
impact varies locally. French and all Belgian EIIs benefit from the zonal average cost price
and reach a higher level than before the inception of the ETS (NETS R)14. In contrast, the
zonal price becomes so expensive in the Dutch locations that EIIs’ power demand becomes
lower than in the reference ETS level (ETS R). German EIIs benefit from the zonal price
11Nuclear power plants devoted to EIIs in the ETS SAC amount to 39,423 MW while in the ETS ZAC are
39,805 MW, which respectively correspond to the 49% and the 42% of the total dedicated capacity. We have
similar results also for the renewable capacities: 7,499 MW in the ETS SAC and 7,275 MW in the ETS ZAC.
12In order the capacities dedicated to EIIs are: nuclear, lignite, renewable, coal, CCGT and hydro.
13The drop computed with respect to the NETS R amounts to 19%.
14EIIs’ demands in France and in the Belgian locations Merchtem and Gramme are 243 TWh, 43 TWh and
21 TWh in the NETS R scenario, while they amount to 254 TWh, 44 TWh and 23 TWh in the ETS ZAC
case.
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system.
6.3 Welfare Analysis
The welfare analysis presented in Table 5 give an alternative view of these phenomena.
Investments increase social benefit as seen from Tables 5 and 3. This holds for all cases. The
171.58 Billion ewelfare entailed by the zonal price regime (ETS ZAC) is almost identical
to that of the reference ETS case (ETS R) which amounts to 171.72 Billion e. This value
is also the one achieved with the same reference investment case but with fixed capacities
(IFC ETS R). All this suggests that the zonal price system with investments effectively and
efficiently mitigates the electricity cost induced by the ETS. Note that the N-EIIs’ surplus
with zonal price (ETS ZAC) is almost identical to that in the reference ETS system (ETS R)
Billion e II NETS R II ETS R II ETS SAC II ETS ZAC
EIIs 20.18 14.68 12.47 15.08
N-EIIs 136.97 132.55 130.89 132.56
Consumers 157.15 147.23 143.36 147.65
Generators 15.79 23.51 26.09 22.95
Allowances 6.90 8.90 6.91
TSO 0.52 0.99 1.21 0.98
Welfare 173.46 171.72 170.66 171.58
Table 5: Welfare under Different Investment Scenarios
The analysis of the EIIs’ and N-EIIs’ surplus reflect demand evolutions. The zonal price
increases EIIs’ surplus (ETS ZAC) compared to the reference ETS marginal cost scenario
(ETS R). Not shown on the table, EIIs’ surplus increases in France and in Belgium overcome
surplus reductions in the remaining locations.
The situation is different under the single price system (ETS SAC), but are again in line
with the observation of the demand. Industries globally reduce both electricity demand and
surplus with respect to the reference ETS case (ETS R) levels. The decrease occurs in France
and the Belgian Gramme node and is not compensated by the increases a the other locations.
In contrast, generators gain in all ETS scenarios. Line “Generators” of Table 5 reports
their profits computed by assuming that all allowances needed are fully grandfathered. Prof-
its increase with respect to the non ETS reference case (NETS R) by 49%, 65% and 45%
respectively in the ETS reference case (ETS R), single price case (ETS SAC) and zonal price
case (ETS ZAC). The line “Allowances” reports the global allowances costs computed as the
product of the allowance prices in the different scenarios and the emission cap. The gen-
erators’ profits under the hypothesis of full auctioning are simply obtained by subtracting
these allowance values from the corresponding profit reported at line “Generators”. Note
that generators’ profits are higher than before the inception of ETS (NETS R) even with full
auctioning. This phenomenon is explained by the general augment of the electricity prices
(at least those paid by N-EIIs) caused by the ETS.
Again, the social welfare includes the TSO’ merchandising profits accruing from the in-
troduction of a flow based market coupling organization in transmission.
15
7 Modelling the Combination of the ETS Induced Carbon and
the Electricity Costs (DII)
We now account for the EIIs’ direct carbon costs and participation to the emission market.
This is done in two steps. We first expand the cap on allowances to include EIIs’ emissions.
Because of lack of information on the separate reactions of the EIIs to electricity and al-
lowances prices, we then embed both effects in the EIIs’ electricity demand function. This is
done by adding a carbon component to the price of electricity: the approach is described in
Appendix G.
We analyze two different investment scenarios: one without free allowance to industries
(hereafter “EIINA”) and one with free allowances (hereafter “EIIA”). The current legislative
proposal for the period after 2012 does not clearly state what the policy towards EIIs will
be. Article 10b of the proposed revision of Directive 2003/87/EC states that Not later than
June 2011, the Commission shall, in the light of the outcome of the international negotiations
and the extent to which these lead to global greenhouse gas emission reductions, ..., submit
to the European Parliament and to the Council an analytical report assessing the situation
with regard to energy-intensive sectors or sub-sectors that have been determined to be ex-
posed to significant risks of carbon leakage. This shall be accompanied by any appropriate
proposals, which may include: (1) adjusting the proportion of allowances received free of
charge by those sectors or sub-sectors under Article 10a (compare Section 1); (2) inclusion
in the Community scheme of importers of products produced by the sectors or sub-sectors
determined in accordance with Article 10a. Any binding sectoral agreements which lead to
global emissions reductions of the magnitude required to effectively address climate change,
and which are monitorable, verifiable and subject to mandatory enforcement arrangements
shall also be taken into account when considering what measures are appropriate.
We assume that the EU acts with the double objective of protecting its industry and
maintaining the overall emission reduction objective. Supposing (for technical reasons) that
EIIs production and electricity consumption are proportional, we further introduce the major
policy assumption that free allowances will be allocated proportionally to EIIs’ production
(benchmarking policy) and hence to their electricity consumption. This policy fits the objec-
tive of protecting EIIs in the international competition. Alternatively, one can also consider
the assumption simply as a first step of the analysis. We calibrate the demand for allowances
and the industrial emission factors on the year 2005 (available at CITL [1]). The data used in
the models of this section are the same as before, except for the introduction of these emission
factors and the total emission cap, which is increased to 710 Mio ton p.a in order to account
for EIIs emissions. We concentrate on the joint impact of the special pricing contracts and
the free allowances.
We implemented both the fixed capacity and investment models but, for the sake of
brevity, only report results with investments. As before, we drop the “DII” model identifier
for results obtained under the assumptions of this section.
Table 6 reports the annual EIIs, N-EIIs’ and total electricity demand in the different
scenarios. The columns “II” recall results obtained in Section 6 with the sole electricity
cost. The other columns lists new results obtained by modelling both carbon and electricity
costs under the alternative assumptions that EIIs do not receive (“EIINA”) and receive free
allowances (“EIIA”).
The comparison of the second and following two columns of Table 6 quantify the impact
of the carbon cost on EIIs. This points to a very obvious message: adding carbon costs
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IMPACTS on EIIs IMPACTS on N-EIIs TOTAL DEMAND
TWh II DII II DII II DII
EIINA EIIA EIINA EIIA EIINA EIIA
NETS R 706 665 1,371
ETS R 590 517 574 654 657 652 1,244 1,174 1,226
ETS SAC 575 492 580 650 656 650 1,225 1,148 1,230
ETS ZAC 611 Infeasible 585 654 Infeasible 651 1,265 Infeasible 1,236
Table 6: EIIs and N-EIIs’ Annual Electricity Demand under Different Market Organizations
to electricity costs further reduces EIIs’ activities. The overall decrease can be decomposed
in two parts. The move from 706 TWh (II NETS R) to 590 TWh (II ETS R) observed
in the second column is the impact of the electricity cost without special contracts and
carbon cost (see Section 6 for more details). Carbon cost without free allowances further
lowers consumption from 590 TWh (II ETS R) to 517 TWh (ETS R EIINA). Free allowances
granted in amounts similar to the second phase of the ETS drastically reduce this second
impact which is now limited to a decrease of demand from 590 TWh (II ETS R) to 574 TWh
(ETS R EIIA).
We saw that N-EIIs reduce their electricity demand under the ETS because of higher
prices. The burden put on EIIs when there is no free allocation helps N-EIIs recover from
that situation: the significant demand drop of EIIs’ demand in the reference ETS scenario
(ETS R) frees generation capacity and reduces the marginal cost of electricity to N-EIIs.
Free allowances eliminate this recovery of N-EIIs. The results confirm that free allowances
mitigate the impact of carbon cost on EIIs. They also reveal an impact on N-EIIs.
It remains to examine whether special contracts still mitigate the impact of the electricity
cost on EIIs. The outcome is mixed and, as shown in Table 6, can even be extreme. A com-
bination of zonal pricing and full auctioning (ETS ZAC EIINA) makes the model infeasible,
implying that it is impossible to meet the environmental target without free allowances for
EIIs15. The special price contracts are only productive under free allowances; zonal prices
then do better than regional prices. We elaborate on these findings.
7.1 Reference Case with (DII ETS R) and without (DII NETS R) ETS:
Full Auctioning (EIINA) and Free Allowances (EIIA)
The addition of the carbon cost to electricity cost without a compensation through free al-
lowances further reduces EIIs’ demand from 590 TWh (II ETS R) to 517 TWh (ETS R EIINA).
All zones contribute to the decrease. Investments reduce from 29,242 MW in the reference
ETS case with the sole electricity costs (II ETS R), to 14,921 MW with both carbon and
electricity costs (ETS R EIINA), no allowance and no special price contract (compare Tables
10 and 11 in Appendix H). The price of allowances is also low and equal to 12.45 e/ton,
which encourages the use of existing coal capacity. Free allowances significantly mitigate the
impact of carbon cost on EIIs. Industrial demand only decreases from 590 TWh (II ETS R)
to 574 TWh (ETS R EIIA). In this last case, investments amount to a total of 30,338 MW
because of a combined effect of demand increase and capacity restructuring (see Table 12 in
Appendix H). The allowance price increases to 22.26 e/ton and induces investing in clean
15Feasibility is reached by relaxing the emission constraints and indirectly the amount of allowances they
have to pay for.
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technologies and scrapping existing coal capacities. This also increases N-EIIs’ prices and
decreases their consumption compared to the other reference cases in Table 616. Notwith-
standing this improvement EIIs do not recover the position observed with the sole electricity
costs.
To sum up the granting of free allowances in proportion to production, that is according
to a benchmark policy effectively compensates for carbon costs.
7.2 Regional Price (DII ETS SAC): Full Auctioning (EIINA) and Free
Allowances (EIIA)
7.2.1 Full auctioning (EIINA)
A regional price (ETS SAC) with full auctioning of allowances does not help EIIs. We argued
in Section 6.2 devoted to the sole electricity cost that the regional price reduces consumption
from 590 TWh (II ETS R) to 574 TWh (II ETS SAC) and that the diversity of national
energy policies explains this counter-productive effect. The application of a regional price to
a market with both carbon and electricity costs and no free allowances similarly decreases
EIIs’ demand from 517 TWh (ETS R) to 492 TWh (ETS SAC). In short, EIIs suffer not
only from both carbon and electricity costs but also from the counter-productive effect of
the intended (regional price) remedy. The explanation is similar to the one of Section 6.2:
a regional price applied on diverging energy policies subsidizes exports of nuclear energy by
reducing the transmission costs of that export. This deprives French EIIs from the benefits of
domestic nuclear developments. French EIIs consumption drops from 211 TWh in the pure
marginal cost pricing (ETS R) to 152 TWh (ETS SAC) with the regional price. Belgian
EIIs’ consumption similarly drops in Gramme from 17 TWh to 15 TWh between these two
scenarios. As in Section 6.2, the regional price (ETS SAC) benefit EIIs in the remaining
locations, with respect to the corresponding reference case. Altogether the rises do not
compensate French and Belgian losses.
A by-product is that N-EIIs benefit from the regional price. Decreasing consumption
lowers the allowance price to 14.71 e/ton (ETS SAC) and hence also the marginal cost of
electricity to N-EIIs. These increase their consumption with respect to the levels computed
with the regional price when only accounting for electricity cost (II ETS SAC)17.
Finally, the reduced EIIs’ demand of electricity and low allowance price affect investments.
These reduce to 8,927 MW with a regional price without free allowances (ETS SAC EIINA)
MW (see Table 11), -66% less than with the sole electricity costs (II ETS SAC).
7.2.2 Free allowances (EIIA)
Free allowances improve the picture: EIIs electricity demand increases from 574 TWh with
marginal cost pricing (ETS R EIIA) to 580 TWh with regional price (ETS SAC EIIA). This
looks like a marginal variation, but it is significant when compared to the application of the
regional price with full auctioning where EIIs demand was 492 TWh Again, French EIIs have
16Like in the other reference investment cases in Table 6, coal and CCGT plants define the N-EIIs’ summer
and winter electricity prices in the DII ETS R EIIA model. N-EIIs’ demand falls is summer are 0.3% and 1%
with regard to the II ETS R and the DII ETS R EIINA cases, while in winter are respectively of 0.3% and
0.7%.
17Note that both in the II ETS SAC and the DII ETS SAC EIINA models, coal and CCGT plants define N-
EIIs’ electricity prices in summer and in winter respectively. Considering the marginal cost pricing approach,
a lower allowance price reduce also electricity price if fuel charges do not change.
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to give up some of the benefit of domestic nuclear capacities because of a pricing system that
subsidizes exports. The same happens in the Belgian node Gramme. This implies that the
decrease of French consumption is drastic, even though smaller in Gramme. These decreases
are barely compensated by the increases in other countries18 but the net result is this time
positive.
N-EIIs, which do not incur direct carbon costs, roughly maintain their consumption with
respect to the regional price scenario computed with the sole electricity cost (II ETS SAC)
(see Tables 6). The key element here is the is allowance price, which at 24.80 e/ton remains
the same in both scenarios and adds to coal and CCGT fuel costs to set the electricity price
for N-EIIs.
Finally, investments in new capacity totally amount to 29,544 MW, a much higher value
than with full auctioning (compare Tables 11 and 12 in Appendix H). This again results from
a joint demand increase and technology restructuring effect due to the high allowance price.
7.3 Zonal price (DII ETS ZAC): Full Auctioning (EIINA) and Free Al-
lowances (EIIA)
The combination of zonal prices, carbon cost and full auctioning makes the model infeasible:
the market cannot meet the reduction target. Free allowances restore the situation. EIIs
increase their activity with respect to various other situations as can be seen from the results
of Table 6. The increase of demand from 574 TWh with marginal cost pricing and free
allowances (ETS R EIIA) to 585 TWh with zonal prices and free allowances (ETS ZAC EIIA)
indicates that this policy mix partially remedies the demand lost because of the electricity
cost. But this recovery is small: one can measure the loss incurred by EIIs as a result of
the ETS after compensation with free allowances by the drop of demand from 706 TWh
(II NETS R) to 574 TWh (ETS R EIIA). A recovery of 11 TWh is only 8% of that amount.
The reason again lies in the diversity of energy policies, which this time operates as follows:
French and all Belgian industries increase their electricity demand compared to the reference
case ETS R EIIA because of their access to the nuclear and new renewable capacities; but
EIIs’ consumption in the other nodes falls because they miss this access.
This larger electricity demand increases the allowance price. It amounts to 24.76 e/ton
against the 22.26 e/ton in the corresponding reference case with free allowances (ETS R EIIA).
The combination of these demand and allowance price effects in turn increases investment
which now amount to 32,957 MW
As before, the higher allowance price slightly increases N-EIIs’ electricity prices compared
to the reference marginal cost case (ETS R)19: N-EIIs’ consumption falls by -0.2% (see Tables
6).
7.4 Welfare Analysis
Tables 7 and 8 report the surpluses/profits of the market players when allowances are respec-
tively fully auctioned and are given for free. We report the EIIs’ gross and the net surpluses,
that are before and after accounting for allowance payments respectively. The allowance val-
ues are indicated in line “Allowances (EIIs)”. Note that by construction, in the EIINA model,
18In absolute values, the fall of the French industrial demand is from 240 TWh in the ETS R EIIA to 174
TWh in the ETS SAC EIIA. In Gramme, the EIIs’ demand drop is from 20 TWh to 19 TWh.
19Again, coal and CCGT defines their periodical prices both in the DII ETS R EIIA and in the
DII ETS ZAC EIIA. The difference between the two models is still represented by allowance price.
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these values are subtracted from the EIIs’ gross surplus, while in EIIA models they adds to
the gross surplus. In both cases, they result in the net surplus. A similar presentation applies
to generators. “Gross generators” and “Net generators” show profits respectively with and
without full allowance grandfathering. Costs of allowances are reported in line “Allowances”.
EIINA
Billion e II NETS R DII ETS R DII ETS SAC
Net EIIs 20.18 15.58 13.85
Allowances (EIIs) 4.18 4.71
Gross EIIs 11.40 9.14
N-EIIs 136.97 133.88 133.20
Consumers 157.15 149.46 147.05
Gross Generators 15.79 21.23 22.87
Allowances 4.47 5.30
Net Generators 16.76 17.57
TSO 0.52 0.84 0.92
Welfare 173.46 171.53 170.84
Table 7: Welfare Analysis of the DII EIINA Models
EIIs’ surplus parallel consumption tendencies in the different full auctioning (EIINA) sce-
narios. The same is true for N-EIIs’ surplus. The ETS increases generators profits (move
from II NETS R to ETS R EIINA or ETS SAC EIINA) and this notwithstanding the ab-
sence of free allowances. Note that these profits do not contain any element of market power:
they simply result from the competitive mechanism of marginally passing allowance costs
into electricity prices
EIIA
Billion e II NETS R DII ETS R DII ETS SAC DII ETS ZAC
Gross EIIs 20.18 13.97 12.54 14.00
Allowances (EIIs) 0.05 0.17 0.02
Net EIIs 14.03 12.71 14.02
N-EIIs 136.97 131.78 130.84 131.43
Consumers 157.15 145.76 143.38 145.45
Generators 15.79 24.43 25.24 24.43
Allowances 7.99 8.90 8.89
Net Generators 16.44 16.34 15.54
TSO 0.52 1.08 1.22 1.10
Welfare 173.46 171.26 169.84 170.97
Table 8: Welfare Analysis of the DII EIIA Models
In the EIIA, the profit pattern of generators is more diverse than in Table 7. Profits
increase compared to pre ETS situation (II NETS R) in both the marginal (ETS R EIIA)
and regional price scenarios (ETS SAC EIIA). But it slightly decreases in the zonal price
scenario (ETS ZAC EIIA).
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8 Conclusion
We analyse policies consisting of a mix of free allowances and special electricity contracts for
EIIs. We find that special full cost based pricing contracts help relieve the electricity costs
imposed by the ETS on EIIs. But the benefits of these contracts are hampered by differences
of national energy policies. The regional price helps EIIs located in non nuclear countries and
the opposite is true for the zonal contracts. All in all, zonal prices seem to do better. This is
to some extent not surprising because the regional price system embeds a subsidizing effect
that can only be detrimental to efficiency. Zonal prices may not look like an internal market
solution but the regional price, with its subsidizing effects, is a false internal market solution.
The differences as to who gains and who looses in the different policies and the willingness to
maintain national policies suggest that it will be difficult to arrive at an harmonized solution
in the EU.
The situation is clearer for free allowances. As expected they always help EIIs recover
their carbon costs, at least when applied as here on a benchmarking basis. The difficulty is
thus to get the benchmarking principle accepted at the EU level.
N-EIIs are generally loosing in the adventure. They remain priced at marginal cost and
hence suffer from higher allowances cost than EIIs which pay them at average cost. Moreover,
the higher the success of the EIIs policy is, the higher the allowance price and hence the
electricity price to N-EIIs.
This analysis does not take any position on the importance of carbon leakage. It simply
points to problems that could arise were this phenomenon important. It is indeed particularly
worrying to note that it is extremely difficult to find quantitative information about the
reality of the phenomenon and the reaction of the EIIs to electricity an carbon costs. A main
conclusion of the analysis is thus to draw the attention to the fact that we need to understand
these reactions much better than is the case today. A last comment is the crucial importance
of nuclear policy. Renewable and nuclear are key players in the policies investigated here.
But we probably cannot afford to only rely on subsidized renewable.
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Appendix A: Underlying Mathematical Techniques and their
Implementations
Our models are formulated as complementarity problems. More specifically, given a cone K
and a mapping F : K → Rn, the complementarity problem, denoted by CP (K,F ) is to find
a nonnegative vector x ∈ Rn satisfying the following condition:
0 ≤ F (x)⊥x ≥ 0 (1)
where F (x) is assumed to be nonnegative. The use of the term “complementarity” derives
from the concept of orthogonality (⊥) stated in the definition. In fact, the scalar product
F (x) · x equals zero.
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Complementarity based models offer a natural approach to construct partial and general
equilibrium problems where several market agents interact together. In our specific case,
we consider the generators, the consumers and the TSO. Their complementarity models are
obtained by computing the KKT conditions of their optimization models and matching them
with the associated primal and dual variables.
Generators solve two different pricing models in accordance with the electricity pricing
scenario considered. In the reference case, representing a perfectly competitive market, gen-
erators are (energy and transmission) price takers and maximize their profits accruing from
selling electricity to both consumer segments. In doing that, they have to account for the
capacity constraint of their power plants.
In the leakage mitigation scenarios, generators maximize their profit when selling to N-
EIIs and minimize the cost of supplying EIIs. This different optimization approach is a direct
consequence of the application of average cost prices which do not lead to maximize profits.
However, generators are charged in the same way for transmission on both segments.
This has also some mathematical implications. While our perfectly competitive opti-
mization model defines a convex problem and has a global solution, the average cost pricing
scenarios introduce non- convexity20 that may lead to either a multiplicity of disjoint equi-
libria or no equilibrium. Apart from a very difficult case in the third stage of our analysis,
our average cost pricing models have several disjoint solutions21.
In any pricing scenarios, EIIs and N-EIIs maximize their surpluses. In addition, our
models account for the energy market balance, the transmission and the emission constraints.
The final complementarity problems are obtained by assembling together the KKT con-
ditions of the market agents’ optimization problems and the market clearing relations. This
set of complementarity problems are solved in GAMS by PATH as explained by Dirkse and
Ferris [5].
Appendix B: Pricing Effects in the Reference Cases with and
without ETS
Appendix B.1. With Fixed Capacities
The introduction of the carbon market has a dual effect on the seasonal marginal prices of
electricity. Summer prices increase in IFC ETS R compared to IFC NETS R. We observe
that the same coal plant set the price of electricity at the hub both in the IFC NETS R and
IFC ETS R models. But in IFC ETS R, generators pass the allowance (opportunity) costs
in the electricity prices which thus increases the price paid by EIIs and N-EIIs. The result
is opposite in winter where prices decrease under the ETS. The cause is the EIIs’ demand
decrease which eliminates the most emitting plants from the merit order: generators use
both old single cycle natural gas and oil-fired power plants in the IFC NETS R scenario,
which entail a high electricity price. These highly emitting plants are abandoned in the
ETS where CCGT power stations become marginal. This decreases the price of electricity.
The combination of a lower price and a lower demand may look counter-intuitive, but it is
explained by the imposed equality of EIIs power demand in both the summer and winter. It
is not the lower winter price that induces the lower EIIs’ demand, but the combination of a
20Non-convexity corresponds to non-monotonicity in the complementarity problems.
21We obtained different results by setting different starting points for the algorithm.
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higher summer price and a lower winter price that implies a lower demand in both summer
and winter. The ETS introduces some changes in technology mix used to produce electricity
with a consequent modification of the electricity prices. In particular, in the ETS R scenarios
with carbon restrictions, this interpretation is confirmed by the more intuitive behaviour of N-
EIIs. There is no inter–seasonal link of consumption for these consumers. They accordingly
increase their consumption by 1% in the winter period in the IFC ETS R scenario where
prices are a little bit lower in each node than in the IFC NETS R scenario. In summer,
instead, they reduce their energy utilization by almost 3% as a consequence of the higher
power prices. The decrease of the summer N-EIIs’ demand prevails on the corresponding
winter increase and this results in a global N-EIIs’ demand reduction as indicated in Table
2. The phenomenon globally illustrates that generators’ capability to transfer their carbon
costs in the final price paid by consumers is limited in the long-term if the reaction of the
EIIs is important.
Appendix B.2. With Investments
Increases of electricity prices cause these global demand fall: coal and CCGT power plants set
the marginal electricity prices respectively in summer and in winter both with and without
the ETS. The marginal cost prices then increase because of the additional carbon cost implied
by the ETS.
Appendix C: Impact of Investments on Electricity Demand of
the Reference Case with and without ETS
The comparison of the data reported in Tables 2 and 4 shows that, in the absence of the ETS
and with investments (II NETS R) EIIs increase their demand by 18% compared to the case
with fixed capacities (IFC NETS R), that is, an increase from 598 TWh to 706 TWh. N-EIIs’
increase is about +2% (from 649 TWh to 665 TWh). This positive tendency is also confirmed
by the couple II ETS R and IFC ETS R: with investments and ETS, EIIs augment their
electricity consumption by 11% (from 531 TWh to 590 TWh) compared to the application
of the ETS with fixed capacities. N-EIIs raise their energy demand by 1% (from 646 TWh
to 654 TWh).
Appendix D: Discussion of Investments Patterns in the “II”
scenarios
Among the 43,788 MW of new capacities invested without ETS (II NETS R), 17,799 MW
(41%) are nuclear in France, 18,570 MW (42%) lignite in Germany and 7,419 MW (17%)
coal distributed between Belgium and the Netherlands. With the 29,242 MW of new capacity
invested with ETS (II ETS R), 26,641 MW (91%) are new nuclear plants in France and the
remaining 2,600 MW (9%) are renewable in Belgium. Generators choose these locations
for different reasons. As already said, France is the unique country in the model that allows
investments in nuclear; new renewable stations happen to be, in our input data, less expensive
to build in Belgium than in the other countries. Moreover, because of their high capacity
costs and limited availability, there are no investments in hydro plants.
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Appendix E: Capacity allocation in the II ETS SAC and in the
II ETS ZAC Models
Generators reserve 29,533 MW of the 31,992 MW invested under the zonal pricing policy
(II ETS ZAC) to N-EIIs of which 1,620 MW are renewable plants in Belgium and 27,913
MW are nuclear power stations in France. Investments for EIIs are only 2,458 MW of new
renewable plants built in Belgium. In contrast, in the single price regime (II ETS SAC),
17,400 MW of investment go to EIIs and 8,796 are for N-EIIs. Again, these are nuclear
(in France) and renewable (in Germany and in Belgium) power stations that, this time, are
reserved both to EIIs and N-EIIs.
This allocation of new capacities implies that EIIs are mainly supplied by existing plants
and one indeed observes that the allocation of the existing renewable and nuclear capacities
follows an opposite pattern in the two average cost pricing models.
In both the regional and zonal models, old gas and oil existing plants are reserved for
N-EIIs but are never used even in winter. These plants should thus be scrapped. We also
observe that in both average cost pricing scenarios, part of the N-EIIs’ old or new French
nuclear capacities remains idle in summer because total capacity exceeds demand and network
congestion does not allow more export of nuclear energy.
Appendix F: Allowance Prices in the “II” Scenarios
The increase of the allowance price from 19.21 e/ton in the reference ETS case to 24.80 e/ton
under single price (respectively II ETS R and II ETS SAC) explains the N-EIIs’ consumption
decrease: the higher allowance price affects the same coal and CCGT plants that set N-EIIs’
marginal prices in summer and in winter in both scenarios and hence increases electricity
prices. The smaller investment in clean technologies, caused by the drop of investment, and
hence the increased utilization of fossil plants in turn explain the raise of allowance price.
As argued before, new investments are mainly dedicated to N-EIIs in the zonal pricing sys-
tem while EIIs are supplied by existing capacities. The two nodes with investments are thus
largely exporting to N-EIIs. This especially holds for France where old and new nuclear pro-
vides 77% of the electricity generated at the node and covers the 92% of the power exported.
This benefit N-EIIs that recover their ETS reference level of 654 TWh, notwithstanding the
global increased consumption of the EIIs.
Appendix G: Modelling the Direct ETS Impact
The following requires introducing an assumption of proportionality between emissions and
electricity consumption (linear technology). It expresses that EIIs’ emissions depend on
production levels that, in turn, determine electricity consumption. Because of the lack infor-
mation, we consider the whole EIIs sector as one firm. This restriction is not methodological
and it can be relieved with sectoral data. Let pi denote the profit function of this aggregate
firm. We want to study its reaction to changes of both the electricity and allowance prices
and include both effects in the sole demand function. The profit pi is stated as:
pi = py · y − pe · e− po · o− pco2 · co2 (2)
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which is interpreted as follows. Industries’ revenues accrue from selling output y at price py.
They consume non electricity inputs o and electricity e to produce output y. Let po and pe
be the prices of these inputs. Industries incur a cost pco2 for each allowance bought on the
market; co2 is the net purchase, that is the amount of emissions reduced by the allowances
received for free.
Introducing the policy assumption that free allowances are granted proportionally to
production and the technological assumption that the amount of electricity e, allowances co2
and input o vary as a function of production we can write:
• e = α · y
• co2 = (β − γ) · y
• o = ϕ(y)
where α represents the unit electricity consumption (a technical parameter), β is the emission
factor per unit of output y (a technical parameter) and γ is the proportion of free allowances
received by unit y (a policy parameter). ϕ(y) is the consumption of non electricity input as a
function of the output y. Recall that we stated a linear dependence between the demand of
energy e and allowances co2 and the industrial production y (again this is not a methodological
limitation) but for reason that will be clear later in the section, we allow for a slightly more
general treatment of the consumption of non electricity input ϕ(y)
We can then write (2) as a function of the sole output y and obtain:
pi(y) = py · y − pe · α · y − pco2 · (β − γ) · y − po · ϕ(y) (3)
We arrive at the industrial demand of electricity by computing the First Order Conditions
(FOC) of (3) with respect to y and obtain:
∂pi
∂y
= py − pe · α− pco2 · (β − γ)− po · ϕ′(y) = 0 (4)
Our objective is to separately get hold of the electricity price (pe), which measures the indirect
ETS costs and of the allowance price (pco2) which determines the direct carbon cost. We then
re-write condition (4) as follows:
pe · α+ pco2 · (β − γ) = py − po · ϕ
′
(y) (5)
By dividing by α on the left and right hand sides of equation (5), one gets:
pe + pco2 · (
β − γ
α
) =
1
α
[
py − po · ϕ′(y)
]
(6)
which has the form of a demand function: the left hand side is a combination of the electricity
and allowance prices which has the dimension of a euro/MWh while the right hand side is
only a function of the output of the firm (the price of the output is fixed in this partial
equilibrium model). Because we are assuming linear demand functions throughtout, we now
impose the particular functional form ϕ
′
(y) = a+ b · y and write:
pe + pco2 · (
β − γ
α
) =
1
α
[py − po · (a+ b · y)] (7)
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Using the relation e = α · y, we substitute y in (7) and obtain:
pe + pco2 · (
β − γ
α
) = py
1
α
− po a
α
− po b
α2
e (8)
By setting A = py 1α − po aα and B = po bα2 , we have:
pe + pco2 · (
β − γ
α
) = A−Be (9)
This is the intended demand function. Equation (9) represents the industrial demand of
electricity, where pe and e are respectively the EIIs’ electricity price and demand. It includes
also the emission allowance price pco2 multiplied by the factor (
β−γ
α ) which defines the impact
of the application of different emission policies on EIIs. This demand function allows one to
consider different scenarios of free allowances to the EIIs such as:
1. full grandfathering of allowances (β = γ). This is in line with the situation prevailing
in the 2005-2007 ETS phase;
2. Full auctioning of allowances (γ = 0). This is what is foreseen for the period after 2012
by the proposed revision of the ETS Directive;
3. Partial grandfathering of allowances (β 6= γ). This is a more general situation which can
represent a declining free allowance policy for EIIs or a full free allocation as foreseen by
the proposed new ETS Directive in case industries become too exposed to international
competition.
As mentioned before, we limit the analysis to two contrasted scenarios. We first consider
the case of full auctioning which is modelled by setting the value of γ to zero. The factor
(β−γα ) becomes (
β
α), which is an emission factor that we compute on the basis of 2005 data
available at CITL [1]. We refer to this case as “EIINA”. We also consider the scenario “EIIA”
where industries receive a proportion of free allowances. In this scenario, we have the factor
(β−γα ) to which we refer as “allowance factor”. Both approaches are compatible with the
proposed revision of the ETS Directive. The emission component of the electricity price is
pco2 · βα in the EIINA models and pco2 · β−γα in the EIIA scenarios. The EIIs’ demand for
allowances is:
allowance demand =
β − γ
α
· e
The inclusion of the emission/allowance in the industrial electricity demand modifies EIIs’
electricity consumption that now depends on both the power and carbon prices.
Appendix H: Investments and Capacity Allocations
Table 13 report the EIIs’ demands when nuclear investments are unconstrained. EIIs’ demand
is identical in the II NETS R and in the II ETS R scenarios. The reason is that emission
constraint is not binding and hence the EIIs’ demand is set by nuclear marginal cost in both
cases. The situation changes when carbon cost is included in the model. Emission constraint
becomes active at low allowance price. Still EIIs must pay for them, which change their
demand. This effect disappears with free allowances (see Table 13).
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Available Capacity
MW Germany France Merchtem Gramme Krimpen Maastricht Zwolle Total
Hydro 1,505 6,084 0 13 0 0 0 7,602
Renewable 4,584 0.95 20 21 101 101 101 4,930
Nuclear 15,007 45,369 2,078 2,204 337 0 0 64,995
Lignite 17,783 77 0 0 0 0 0 17,860
Coal 24,613 8,824 1,564 979 3,128 0 482 39,590
CCGT 13,544 8,164 2,589 1,207 4,432 2,917 4,834 37,687
Old gas 2,147 256 194 170 833 3,600
Oil based 4,760 55 194 5,009
Total 79,183 73,535 6,500 4,788 8,831 3,018 5,417 181,273
Table 9: Available Capacity by Node in MW
MW CAPACITY
Existing Investments Total
II NETS R 181,273 43,787 225,060
II ETS R 181,273 29,242 210,515
II ETS SAC 181,273 26,195 207,468
II ETS ZAC 181,273 31,991 213,264
Table 10: Total Capacity in the II Scenarios
MW CAPACITY
Existing Investments Total
DII ETS R EIINA 181,273 14,921 196,194
DII ETS SAC EIINA 181,273 8,927 190,200
DII ETS ZAC EIINA Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible
Table 11: Total Capacity in the DII Scenarios with Full Auctioning EIINA
MW CAPACITY
Existing Investments Total
DII ETS R EIIA 181,273 30,338 211,611
DII ETS SAC EIIA 181,273 29,544 210,817
DII ETS ZAC EIIA 181,273 32,957 214,230
Table 12: Total Capacity in the DII Scenarios with Free Allocation EIIA
TWh II DII
EIINA EIIA
NETS R 789
ETS R 789 777 791
ETS SAC 777 764 779
ETS NAC 781 768 783
Table 13: EIIs’ Electricity Demand Under Different Nuclear Investment Scenarios
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